

2014

**IMPROVING COMMUNITY  
RESPONSE TO WILDFIRE:  
2013 FIRE SEASON FINDINGS  
REPORT**

**LITTLE QUEENS FIRE**

In 2013, the Fire Chasers Research Team at North Carolina State University developed a series of incident performance measures in collaboration with incident response and land management professionals. The goal of this effort was to provide metrics that can help improve interagency coordination and communication during complex, large scale wildfires. In the summer of 2013, data on these incident response outcomes were collected from 22 Type I and Type II wildland-urban interface fires in Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington. This report summarizes the findings from the Little Queens Fire in the areas of interagency network performance, incident management team performance, use of social media and incident learning and capacity building.

This report was prepared by

North Carolina State University's Fire Chasers Research Team:

Branda Nowell, Ph.D. (Principal Investigator)

Toddi Steelman, Ph.D. (Principal Investigator)

AJ Faas, Ph.D. • Anne-Lise K. Velez, MPA • Joy Davis, BA •

Clare FitzGerald, MPA • Mary Clare Hano, MPH

## Little Queens Fire: Incident Report

### Study Background

This report summarizes findings on incident response outcomes for the Little Queens Fire that occurred in 2013. The report presents outcomes of the Little Queens Fire compared to twenty-one other Type I and Type II incidents that occurred in Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Washington, and one pilot incident in Colorado, during the 2013 wildfire season. The goal of this report is to provide disaster, fire response, and land management agencies with feedback on the incident. This feedback is designed to help identify areas of strength, as well as prioritize areas for capacity building to improve incident response in the upcoming fire season. This report summarizes findings on the following areas: 1) interagency network performance; 2) incident management team performance; 3) use of social media; and 4) incident learning and capacity building. All findings are based on surveys completed by key personnel associated with the incident management team, host agency, and cooperating disaster response agencies on each incident. County and municipal elected officials in the affected area were also surveyed. Surveys were generally collected from Type I/Type II incident management team members immediately before they transitioned off the incident. Surveys with host agencies and county disaster response agencies were collected in October/ November of 2013. A total of 19 surveys were completed for the Little Queens Fire (50 percent response rate).

### How Should I Interpret the Data in This Report?

Incidents differ in their complexity and more complex incidents can create more challenges. The information contained in this report is based solely on the survey data and indicators *do not* account for differences between incidents. This should be kept in mind when interpreting findings from a single incident in relation to the regional incident averages. Findings with lower response rates should also be interpreted with greater caution as there may be key perspectives that are missing. Recommended questions for reflection in interpreting the findings from this report include:

**In what areas did we excel during this incident? What strategies and actions did we take that may have contributed to this success? What actions can we take to make sure these practices and lessons are retained for future incidents?**

**In what areas were our ratings comparatively less positive? How do we make sense of those? Were there missed opportunities either *before* or *during* the incident that might have improved our outcomes in this area? Are there actions we can take *now* to help ensure future success in this area?**

### **Overview: A brief summary of the Little Queens Fire**

On August 17, 2013 the Little Queens Fire started for unknown reasons in Elmore County, one mile northwest of Atlanta, Idaho. Wilde's Type II Incident Management Team (IMT) was called on to the fire August 19<sup>th</sup>, which according to Inciweb, was in time for the fire's significant push to the southeast on August 22<sup>nd</sup>. To stop the fire's spread towards Atlanta, management undertook a burnout operation, a fire suppression tactic to remove fuel between an advancing fire and an established fire line, utilizing a helicopter and ground crews. Wilde's team stayed on the fire until August 30<sup>th</sup>, when Springer's Type III IMT took over the incident.

At the peak of the fire, 65 residences were threatened and under mandatory evacuation, while 100 outbuildings and four commercial properties were threatened in and around the community of Atlanta. Other values at risk included historical buildings, mining claims, and recreation sites and trails. The Boise and Sawtooth National Forests worked as host units on the Little Queens Fire with local cooperators such as the Boise Fire Department, Elmore County Commissioners, Elmore County Sheriff's Offices, Atlanta Rural Fire Department, and the Atlanta Highway District. Also responding was the Idaho Department of Lands and the Pinedale Field Office of the Bureau of Land Management.


On September 23<sup>rd</sup>, forest closures were substantially rescinded along with trails and roads including the Sawtooth Wilderness. Over about three weeks, the Little Queens fire burned approximately 26,500 acres, losing only one outbuilding.

## Incident Response Network Performance: Little Queens Fire

### What Is an Incident Response Network?

Effective incident response to a complex wildfire event involves the coordination of multiple organizations and agencies with formal response responsibilities during the incident. This group of organizations and agencies can be referred to as the *incident response network*. This network typically includes the incident management team, fire management operations, disaster management operations, county and municipal government, and the media. Diagram 1 shows what this network might look like.

**Diagram 1. Sample Incident Response Network**



### What is network performance?

When working as part of an inter-connected network like the one shown in Diagram 1, the actions of any one agency within the network can affect others in the network. Consequently, incident outcomes are often the result of the *combined* management actions of the entire network, and the level of communication and coordination within it. Not all agencies are involved in all areas of incident response. However, problems in one area of the network can lead to problems in other areas. As a result, effective incident response is not about the performance of any single organization or agency, but is related to the performance of the *network as a whole* in the following areas:

- ❖ Interagency coordination & fire response
- ❖ Public information
- ❖ Road closures
- ❖ Evacuation and re-entry
- ❖ Sheltering & mass care
- ❖ Cost share

To learn more about network performance, we asked all agency and organizational leaders in the incident response network to rate how things went in each of these six areas. Respondents were asked their level of agreement with a set of statements. Options ranged from (1) “strongly disagree” to (5) “strongly agree.” Overall, network performance scores were high. Some areas are also worthy of additional attention prior to fire season 2014. For the twenty-two fires in our sample, overall network performance was the highest for interagency coordination and fire response (average = 4.44) and public information (4.34). On average, lower performance ratings were provided for cost share (3.87), evacuation (3.99), and sheltering/mass care (4.0). See Appendix A for specific questions asked in each category and average level of agreement for each.

**Network Performance: How did things go on the Little Queens Fire?**


Figure 1 shows network performance ratings for the Little Queens Fire in comparison with the average across all twenty-two fires in our sample. Little Queens Fire network performance was higher than average for the areas of evacuation and re-entry and road closures. In the areas of coordination and fire response, sheltering and mass care, cost share, and public information, Little Queens network performance showed slightly more room for improvement than average. Cost share was identified as the area with the most room for improvement on the Little Queens Fire. In particular, respondents saw more room for improvement in the use of pre-agreed frameworks and principles to expedite cost share agreements (see Appendix A for further details).

**KEY FINDINGS**

Evacuation and re-entry and road closures were areas of success on Little Queens, particularly in the area of communicating trigger points for road closures

Cost share, particularly with regard to using pre-agreed frameworks, was identified as an area for improvement

**Figure 1. Average Network Performance by Activity: Little Queens Fire**



## Incident Management Team Performance: Perspectives from host agencies and local cooperators

On each incident, we asked representatives of local cooperating agencies, the Forest Service, and other host agencies to reflect on how well the incident management team communicated and coordinated with local host agencies and cooperators. Incident management teams (IMTs) were assessed across 19 areas outlined in Table 1 on the following page. The response options ranged from “No room for improvement” to “A lot of room for improvement,” and included “Don’t know” and “Not applicable” choices.

Across all twenty-two incidents, incident management teams were reported to perform the best in: 1) being accessible; 2) acknowledging cooperation; 3) sharing credit; and 4) serving as positive ambassadors in interactions with the local community. On average, scores were quite positive across all areas. However, host communities reported the greatest room for improvement for IMTs in the areas of: 1) obtaining local context information to inform fire operations; 2) incorporating information about local values at risk into fire management plans; and 3) engaging affected jurisdictions in planning and decision making from the beginning. The first column of Table 1 lists the average room for improvement for incident management teams across all fires. The second column displays average room for improvement for the Little Queens Fire incident management team. For each item in Table 1, **lower numbers indicate less room for improvement**. The scale includes (0), indicating “no” room for improvement, (1) “a little,” (2) “some,” (3) “quite a bit,” and (4) “a lot.”


### KEY FINDINGS

- On average, Wilde’s Type II IMT was rated more positively than the regional average in 15 out of 19 areas during the Little Queens Fire
- IMT strengths identified on this incident were:
  - including local agencies in the dissemination of vital information
  - sharing credit with local agencies
- Areas rated as having relatively more room for improvement included:
  - valuing local knowledge and input
  - obtaining local context to inform IMT operations
  - incorporating information about local values at risk into the management of the fire

Average responses for Wilde’s Type II IMT on the Little Queens Fire ranged from 0.3 to 1.3, indicating “no room” to “a little room” for improvement. The team was rated more positively than the regional average in 15 of 19 areas during the Little Queens Fire. Wilde’s Type II IMT was rated most positively in terms of including local agencies in the dissemination of vital information and sharing credit with local agencies during the Little Queens Fire. Areas where the team was nearly equivalent to the regional averages for all fires, but has “a little” room for improve include valuing local knowledge and input, obtaining local contextual information, and incorporating information about local values at risk into the management of the fire. Greatest strengths and areas for improvement for the incident management team on the Little Queens Fire are highlighted in the IMT Key Findings box above.

**TABLE 1. Little Queens Incident Management Team Room for Improvement**


Area for improvement in working with Host Unit(s) and local cooperators	22 Incident Average Room for Improvement (0-4)	Little Queens Average Room for Improvement (0-4)
Including your agency in the dissemination of vital information during the incident	1.2	0.3
Sharing credit with your agency	1	0.5
Seeking to understand organizational culture, values, and capacities of your agency	1.2	0.6
Acknowledging cooperation	1	0.6
Using the incident as a training opportunity to build local capacity	1.2	0.6
Engaging affected jurisdictions in planning and decision making from the beginning	1.3	0.7
Getting your agency information you needed to be effective	1.2	0.7
Valuing your agency’s input	1.2	0.8
Serving as a positive ambassador in interactions with the local community	1	0.8
Being flexible in adapting their fire management strategy to account for local preferences	1.2	0.8
Staying in their lane and not over-stepping their delegation of authority	1	0.8
Being sensitive to local community culture and political climate	1.25	1
Being accessible to you	1	1
Rapidly identifying key local players they needed to be communicating with during the incident	1.2	1
Clarifying roles and responsibilities	1.2	1.1
Being helpful to cooperating agencies	1.1	1.1
Incorporating information about local values at risk (e.g., biological, archeological, cultural, recreational) into the management of the fire	1.3	1.2
Obtaining local context (e.g., burn scars, trail systems, local weather patterns) to inform their operations	1.3	1.3
Valuing local knowledge and local input	1.2	1.3



## Twitter Use

Social networking sites, such as Twitter, have become important tools for sharing information during various emergencies. Researchers are only beginning to study the implications of social media for risk communication and practitioners are often interested in best practices for using social media. As part of our survey, we asked local cooperators and Forest Service personnel whether they knew of an “official” Twitter feed associated with the wildfire incident, whether they subscribed to this feed, and whether or not they found the information on Twitter helpful. Figure 2 shows percentage of Twitter use for Little Queens Fire compared to the average rate across twenty-one fires in our sample that reported on social media.

**Figure 2. Percent Social Media Use and Utility on the Little Queens Fire**



Inciweb, personnel from the Boise National Forest, the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality, Blaine County, representatives of the community of Atlanta, the Idaho State Police, the National Weather Service, and several engaged but not official fire watchers tweeted information about the Little Queens Fire. A substantial portion of the information shared on Twitter came from Inciweb tweets and updates. When compared to the 21 incident average, respondents from the Little Queens Fire had less knowledge of Twitter and were less likely to find Twitter helpful. No respondents reported subscribing to an incident Twitter feed.

### KEY FINDINGS

- Little Queens Fire respondents were less aware of Twitter information resources than respondents across other incidents
- No Little Queens Fire respondents reported subscribing to an incident Twitter feed
- Little Queens Fire respondents did not find Twitter information sources as helpful as did respondents across other incidents


## **Moving Forward: Incident learning and capacity building**

The field of incident response prioritizes using every incident as an opportunity for learning and relationship building to improve capacity for responding to future events. To assess incident learning and capacity building, respondents were asked to report how personal outcomes were influenced by the incident in the areas of: 1) increased knowledge of other agencies' missions and values; 2) enhanced knowledge of the Incident Command System (ICS); and 3) increased familiarity and strengthened professional relationships within the local network. Respondents were asked to rate how each factor was affected by the incident, on a scale ranging from (1) “much worse” to (5) “much better”, with (3) indicating “no change.” See Appendix B for specific questions asked in each category and average level of agreement for each.

### **KEY FINDINGS**

- Over all wildfire incidents we studied, evidence suggests that knowledge of agency missions and values, ICS knowledge, and professional relationships were perceived to have improved
- Little Queens Fire respondents reported higher scores than regional averages in all three areas
- For the Little Queens Fire, the greatest impact was on professional relationships

**Figure 3. Incident Learning and Capacity Building from the Little Queens Fire**



Across all the wildfire incidents we studied, evidence suggests that knowledge of other agency missions and values, ICS knowledge, and professional relationships were perceived to have improved. Across all incidents, local cooperators and host agencies reported the greatest improvements in the area of professional relationships, which included respondents reporting strengthened professional

relationships with leaders of cooperating agencies, stronger relationships within counties, and better knowledge of the capacities and constraints of cooperating agencies. The least improvement was shown in local cooperator and host agency knowledge of agency missions and values, which included knowledge of the mission and values of state land management agencies and the National Forest. In the middle range is knowledge of the Incident Command System, which includes familiarity with ICS, opportunities to gain additional training in an area of incident response, and understanding how to work with an IMT, including what the IMT can and cannot do to assist your county during an incident.

On the Little Queens Fire, all responses varied between “no change” and “somewhat better” for knowledge of agency missions and values, ICS knowledge, and professional relationships. Little Queens Fire respondents reported slightly higher scores than regional averages in all three areas.

## APPENDIX A. Network Performance: Little Queens Fire

Areas of Network Performance	22 Incident Average Level of Agreement (1-5)	Little Queens Fire Average Level of Agreement (1-5)
<b>Coordination &amp; Fire Response</b>		
A coordinated set of fire management objectives were agreed upon among all affected jurisdictions	4.29	4.06
All concerned jurisdictions prioritized maintaining good communication across agencies	4.21	4.13
Credit for success and effort was shared among agencies during public meetings and media events	4.37	4.21
There was a general willingness across agencies to offer assistance to other agencies or jurisdictions	4.48	4.13
“Borrowed resources” were released in a timely fashion to minimize burden on the lending agency	4.38	3.80
Community values at risk from wildfire were readily identified	4.64	4.19
Efforts to protect community values were appropriate given available resources and risks to firefighter safety	4.59	4.38
The overall strategy taken in managing this fire was appropriate	4.40	4.13
Local resources were incorporated into the incident management operations	4.50	4.20
<b>Evacuation Performance</b>		
Cooperating agencies were able to use existing evacuation plans to quickly establish a coordinated evacuation strategy	3.82	3.00
Residents received timely notification of evacuation status using clear, pre-established language to distinguish between an evacuation warning and an evacuation notice	4.03	4.00
Evacuations were executed in a timely and orderly fashion	4.15	3.73
Cooperating agencies had a prepared plan for how re-entry into evacuated areas would be coordinated	4.05	4.25
Trigger points for when evacuated areas would be opened for re-entry were clearly communicated to the public	3.88	4.18
Re-entry was carried out in an organized and orderly fashion	4.15	4.50
<b>Sheltering &amp; Mass Care</b>		
Adequate sheltering options were prepared to house evacuees	4.16	3.40
Sheltering options were clearly communicated to evacuees	4.01	3.40
Donations for evacuees were well-coordinated	3.74	NA
Auxiliary care needs of evacuees (e.g., food, water, clothing, transportation, spiritual or mental health assistance) were adequately provided for	4.05	3.33
Adequate sheltering options were made available to evacuate pets and livestock	3.88	3.50
<b>Cost Share Performance</b>		
We used pre-agreed frameworks/principles to expedite cost share agreements	3.80	3.40
The process through which cost share was decided upon was fair	3.86	3.75
The resulting cost share agreement was fair	3.96	3.60

**APPENDIX A. Network Performance: Little Queens Fire (continued)**

<b>Areas of Network Performance</b>	<b>22 Incident Average Level of Agreement (1-5)</b>	<b>Little Queens Fire Average Level of Agreement (1-5)</b>
<b>Public Information Performance</b>		
Public information was coordinated among cooperating agencies to ensure continuity of the message	4.35	4.46
Local resources were leveraged to ensure timely dissemination of public information	4.32	4.40
Social media was used effectively to provide timely public updates concerning the status of the fire	4.16	3.50
A system for communication with the media was put in place to ensure timely dissemination of public information	4.42	4.00
<b>Road Closure Performance</b>		
All cooperating and fire management agencies maintained a timely awareness of the status of road closures	4.25	4.14
Trigger points for making decisions about road closures were proactively communicated to the local community	4.05	4.46
A consistent message was provided to the public about the status of road closures	4.11	4.46

## APPENDIX B. Incident Learning and Capacity Building: Little Queens Fire

Areas of Incident Learning and Capacity Building	22 Incident Average Reported Impact (1-5)	Little Queens Fire Reported Impact (1-5)
<b>Knowledge of Agency Mission &amp; Values</b>		
Your understanding of the mission and values of state land management agencies (e.g., Oregon State Forestry, DNR/DNRC, Idaho Department of Lands, Fire/Timber Protective Associations, etc.) in your area	3.43	3.45
Your understanding of the mission and values of federal land management agencies (e.g., BLM, National Park Service, USFS, etc.) in your area	3.38	3.45
<b>Knowledge of ICS</b>		
Your understanding of what an incident management team can and cannot do to assist your county during an incident	3.44	3.91
Your familiarity with Incident Command Systems	3.48	3.82
Your knowledge of how to work effectively with an incident management team	3.67	4.09
Opportunities for you to gain additional training in an area of incident response	3.45	3.90
<b>Professional Relationships and Networks</b>		
The strength of working relationships within your county	3.76	4.00
The strength of working relationships between your county the local National Forest District	3.60	4.00
The strength of working relationships with National Forest Headquarters	3.42	3.22
Your knowledge of the capabilities and constraints of cooperating agencies in your area	3.73	4.36
Your knowledge of the capabilities and constraints of the local National Forest	3.58	3.80
Your professional networks with leaders of cooperating agencies in your area	3.89	4.64
Your knowledge of your local community	3.72	4.27

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Fire Chasers: Improving Community Response to Wildfire Project

[firechasers.ncsu.edu](http://firechasers.ncsu.edu)

20 Enterprise St., Suite 6

Raleigh, NC 27607

Phone: (919) 576-0843

info@ncsufirechasers.com

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